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Dominant Ethnicity and Dominant Nationhood: Empirical and Normative 
Aspects  
 
Current scholarship pertaining to ethnicity and nationalism ploughs three main 
furrows: state nationalism, minority nationalism and minority ethnicity. To this list, 
one may add the literature on migration, which is linked to minority ethnicity; 
citizenship studies, which examines the interplay between state nationalism and 
minority ethnicity; and normative political theory, which concerns itself with the 
interplay between state nations, minority nations, and minority ethnies. All three 
literatures therefore neglect the increasingly important phenomenon of dominant 
ethnicity. (Kaufmann 2004a) 
 
What then, is dominant ethnicity? To answer this question, we need to be specific 
about our terminology. Since 1980, great strides have been made toward 
differentiating the concepts of state, nation, and ethnic group, and sketching the 
linkages between such phenomena.1 States place the emphasis on the instruments of 
coercion, government and boundary demarcation within a territory. Ethnic groups 
refer to communities of (supposedly) shared ancestry, almost always accompanied by 
notions of an ancestral homeland and cultural boundary markers. Nations comprise an 
uneasy hybrid of elements from ethnies and the modern state: they are better 
integrated, more politically self-conscious and spatially demarcated than ethnies, but 
can employ a myth of political or ideological origins which is not specifically 
genealogical. In addition, nations do not always control their own political apparatus 
nor must they maintain a monopoly of organized violence over their territory, hence 
the possibility of 'stateless nations.'  
 The connections between these entities are equally subtle, and are the subject of 
intense controversy between those of constructivist and historicist bent. According to 
'ethno-symbolist' theorists, some ethnies were transformed into nations in the modern 
era, while others, often due to their territorial dispersion, lack of political ambition or 
low level of self-consciousness (i.e. Balinese, Cajuns, Aragonese), did not emerge as 
nations.2 Moreover, of those ethnies that successfully achieved nationhood, many 
(such as Scots, Tibetans) have failed to achieve modern statehood. Dominant ethnicity 
refers to the phenomenon whereby a particular ethnic group exercises dominance 
within a nation. Notice that the dominant ethnie need not dominate the state in which 
'its' nation resides. This is the case, as Danielle Juteau points out, with the pures laines 
Quebecois, who dominate the nation of Quebec but not the Canadian state. (Juteau 
2004) The same holds true for the mainly Protestant ethnic Scots of Scotland, some of 
whom have been accused of discrimination against the local English minority.  
This flags up the myriad ways in which an ethnic group can be dominant: 
demographic, cultural, political, and economic. In pre-1960s Quebec, for instance, 
pures laines Quebecois dominated culturally and in provincial politics, but not 
economically or in federal politics. Today, many ethnic minorities in the developing 
world (i.e. Chinese, Indians, Lebanese and White trading minorities) control the local 
economy but are politically weak, hence, argues Sino-Phillipine Amy Chua, their 
vulnerability to genocide in a world of economic liberalisation and populist 
democratisation. (Chua 2003)  
The most common historical combination, however, has been ethno-political 
dominance over a culturally diverse state. Many empires were controlled by a 
staatsvolk, or dominant ethnic group, despite dynastic intermarriage at the very top. 
Austro-Germans in the Habsburg empire, ethnic Russians in the Tsarist empire, 
Afghan-Turkic-Persian Mughals in India, and Anatolian Turks in the Ottoman empire 
furnish several examples. In the medieval Baltic and Czech lands, German-speakers 
dominated the high culture, economy and polity, but the folk culture of the peasant 
masses remained as a springboard for the development of future Latvian, Czech and 
Estonian dominant ethnicity. In many colonial settings, settler ethnies like the 
Rhodesians, Americo-Liberians and Afrikaners have enjoyed the same political 
dominance, but not cultural dominance. In developing countries after 1945, dominant 
minorities like the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi, Alawi in Syria or Sunni of Iraq often 
retained power. 
The aftermath of the Cold War and the attendant loss of ideological discipline 
led to a fracturing of ex-communist and post-colonial regimes along ethnic lines. This 
is because the socialist ideology which unified the regimes of autocratic leaders like 
Tito, Stalin, Nyerere, Nkrumah or Mobutu has lost its legitimacy. The communist or 
post-independence coalitions, which generally rested on an uneasy alliance between 
different ethnic power bases, has fragmented because of the decline of socialism and 
the rise of the so-called 'third wave' of democratisation. Ethnic structures are generally 
the most dependable vessels for mobilising mass electoral support. Thus democracy, 
as Donald Horowitz has noted, lends itself to ethnic politics. This is the case even if - 
as observers of African politics point out - ethnic blocs are often composed of shifting 
coalitions of smaller ethnic groups. (Horowitz 1985; Mozaffar & Scarritt 2000)  The 
new wave of democratisation in the former communist bloc and developing world has 
thereby inaugurated an era of ethnic party systems. Within these systems, dominant 
ethnic groups have emerged, such as the Kikuyu in Kenya, Akan in Ghana or Sinhala 
in Sri Lanka. They may speak the language of inclusive 'rainbow' nationalism, but 
underneath, they must satisfy their core ethnic constituency. The leadership of the 
Shi'ite dominant group (actually a sect) in Iraq, for example, maintains an outward 
narrative of Iraqi unity, but works privately to advance the Shi'ite interest through 
complicity in anti-Sunni violence.  
What we are seeing today is an epochal shift from dominant minority to 
dominant majority politics brought on by democratisation. The downfall of Sunni 
minority control in Iraq, and its replacement with a Shi'a majority regime, is symbolic 
of this change. Dominant minorities functioned very well in empires or autocratic 
states, where it paid to narrow the circle of power as much as possible. This both 
increased the spoils to insiders and also ensured that there was a trustworthy base of 
support for the regime. Under a democratic system, however, the main principle is 
majority rule, and this gives demographic majorities the edge over traditional elite 
minorities. The decline of Russian minority privilege in the Baltic states and central 
Asia once again reflects the rise of the principle of popular sovereignty and the 
decline of older notions of imperial suzerainty. 
 Whereas dominant majority ethnic groups appear confident in the developing 
world, basking in the principle of majority rule, in the developed world they have 
been thrown on the defensive. The mechanisms differ between the two regions. The 
rise of dominant majorities in the developing world has been generated by political 
upheavals. In the developed world, by contrast, cultural, demographic and economic 
factors have led to pressure on dominant ethnies. Many of today's western nations are 
experiencing an unprecedented degree of pressure from the forces of global 
modernity. In particular, the spread of human and collective rights discourse since the 
1960s has mounted an increasing challenge to the model of ethno-national 
congruence. Western nations, many of which were formed on the basis of dominant, 
'core' ethnic groups, are thus facing pressure to shift their self-definitions from 'ethnic' 
to 'civic' criteria. They are encouraged to look to their future rather than their past, to 
treasure their cultural diversity (past and present) rather than their homogeneity, to 
recognise the autonomy claims of minorities and to be open to foreign trade, foreign 
immigration, and foreign ('multi') cultural influences. In short, global narratives of 
liberal multiculturalism, embedded in both global and national institutions, are driving 
an ever-greater wedge between modern nations and their dominant ethnic groups.  
 Anglo-Americans typify the phenomenon of a dominant ethnic group under 
pressure, but it is worth remembering that this is a relatively recent development. 
Immigration has ebbed and flowed over time to the United States, attaining a peak in 
the two decades after 1900. After 1924, however, the National Origins quota 
immigration scheme effectively reduced the flow until the quotas began to be opened 
up some four decades later. This, along with gerrymandered congressional districts 
which reduced the power of immigrant-dominated northeastern cities, helped the 
dominant white Anglo-Protestant group to retain power and cultural influence. After 
1965, the Anglo-Protestant group began to lose power, but a new 'Anglo' racial 
coalition of European Americans (Protestant, Catholic and Jewish) emerged as the 
dominant group. (Kaufmann 2004) Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, immigration from 
southern and eastern Europe to more prosperous northern and western Europe did take 
place prior to 1939, but on a small scale: the foreign-born generally constituted less 
than one percent of the population of receiving countries in this period. (Baycroft and 
Hewitson 2006: 328)  
Though non-western immigration to Europe began after 1945, this flow 
remained small until the 1960s. Even today, a majority of the foreign-born in many 
western European countries are European immigrants. (Coleman 2006) This, 
however, is beginning to change because of the so-called 'second demographic 
transition' in the developed world toward below-replacement fertility. Much of 
western Europe has had below-replacement fertility for three decades. The 
demographic echo of large numbers of baby boomer mothers moving through their 
childbearing years has allowed dominant ethnic populations to grow or remain stable, 
but these populations are now experiencing real declines. This means that 
immigration will be required to maintain population levels in the future. (Demeny & 
McNicoll 2006) In the coming decades, the young populations on the southern 
periphery of North America and Europe will contrast sharply with the advanced age 
profile of most western countries where some 40 percent of the population will be 
over 60 by 2050. (Goldstone 2007) Improved global communications and transport 
links may abet the flow of labour from developing to developed countries, increasing 
the pressure on dominant ethnic groups and widening the gap between the dominant 
ethnie and the nation-state.  
 What might be the social fallout from these demographic trends? As Fredrik 
Barth and other proponents of boundary theory remind us, populations can flow 
across a boundary and assimilate, leaving the ethnic boundary intact. (Barth 1969) 
Consequently, immigration need not pose a problem for dominant ethnic groups if the 
newcomers assimilate and thereby 'disappear'. Here I refer not merely to cultural 
assimilation, but to a complete process of ethnic assimilation through which the 
descendants of newcomers come to identify with the myths of genealogical origin of 
the receiving group. This is akin to Milton Gordon's 'identificational' and 'marital' 
assimilation stages and is inseparable from inter-ethnic marriage. (Gordon 1964) This 
process typically takes several generations, but can be very effective. The success of 
Magyarisation in Hungary after 1778, Turkification in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries in Anatolia, or mestizaje in Mexico in the period to 1917 provide cases in 
point. (Francis 1976) In all these cases, large numbers of newcomers were grafted on 
to the ethnic core through intermarriage and cultural assimilation. In some cases, the 
only vestige of foreign origins are surnames, i.e. the Irish Gerry Adams' English 
surname, the French-Canadian Daniel Johnson's British surname, or the Italian 
surnames of some South Tyrolean Germans. Even 'established' surnames like the 
English 'Fletcher' or Anglo-American 'Revere' can have foreign immigrant origins 
(17th century French Huguenot in both cases). 
Notice that ethnic assimilation requires a much deeper degree of change than 
mere cultural and economic assimilation, since the latter can coexist with strong 
minority ethnic boundaries. For instance, Ernest Gellner points out that religious 
resources can insulate a community like the German Jews or Pontic Greeks from 
assimilation, rendering it 'counter-entropic'. This is the case even if the community 
speaks the same unaccented language as its hosts and is thoroughly civically 
integrated. (Gellner 1983) Consider two distinct paths of integration in Europe today. 
Those of Caribbean descent are experiencing a process of rapid assimilation and 
intermarriage into the dominant ethnic groups of Britain and Holland, even if 
Caribbeans generally occupy lower-prestige occupations. Indeed, the proportion of 
'pure' to mixed ancestry Caribbeans in Britain is 5:2, but stands at 4:3 among those 
under 4 in the 2001 census. (ONS 2001)  It is now reported that there are more 
children being born to one white and one black parent in the UK than to two black 
parents. By contrast, Muslims (mainly of Bangladeshi and Pakistani descent) in 
Britain marry into the dominant ethnic group at a rate of less than 5 percent. A similar 
picture characterises Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in Holland. (Van Tubergen 
2006) 
Most second generation Muslims in Europe are culturally and economically 
assimilated, but their resistance to ethnic assimilation means that further Muslim 
growth is perceived as a considerable threat to the demographic preponderance of the 
dominant west European ethnic groups. Current projections place the Muslim 
population at between 10 and 15 percent of the west European total in 2050. Not a 
large proportion, but enough to cause anxiety in specific high-immigrant locales like 
Marseille, Rotterdam or Leicester, where far right politicians have played upon the 
fears of downwardly mobile members of the dominant ethnie. Should the proportion 
of the national population comprised of members of the dominant ethnie continue to 
fall, dominant group members will experience an ever greater dissonance between 
their ethnic and national identities.  
If the history of the United States is any guide, this process may lead to 
increasingly strident attempts to heal this breach through high-pressure '100 percent' 
assimilation and immigration restriction. A more extreme response can be seen in 
Assam in northeastern India, a Hindu enclave which has experienced considerable 
Bengali-Muslim immigration since 1948, leading to a Muslim minority of 31 percent 
which currently controls about 60 of Assam's 126 Assembly constituencies. Since the 
1960s, Assamese militants like the AASU have called for the eviction of aliens and 
conducted a bloody terrorist campaign against Bengali immigrants from both West 
Bengal and Bangladesh. (Horowitz 1985; Hussain 2005; Ganguli 2007) We also see 
this in multi-ethnic states with significant internal migration, like Uganda, where the 
settlement of ethnic Bakiga into Banyoro territory in Kibaale district has led to 
localised ethnic conflict. (Green 2006) 
 The confluence of forces at play in the developed world pull in different 
directions. Low native fertility, lower-cost air transport, a globalising economy and 
global communications all facilitate higher immigration, resistance to assimilation and 
thus the erosion of dominant ethnicity. Globalisation in particular allows diasporas to 
maintain cultural, economic and political connections to the homeland over long 
distances, retarding assimilation into the dominant group. (Kotkin 1993; Shain & 
Barth 2003) On the other hand, the increasingly 'loose-bounded', individualistic nature 
of western societies after the social revolutions of the 1960s enables assimilation. 
(Bellah 1987) For instance, the sharp rise in inter-faith marriage between Protestant, 
Catholic and Jewish Americans after 1960 was accompanied by a similar rise in inter-
racial marriage which has arguably paved the way for high white-East Asian and 
white-Hispanic nuptiality. (Kaufmann 2004) Large scale immigration can thereby be 
digested far more quickly than in the past. At the same time, modern techniques of 
surveillance and record-keeping, and the international exchange of electronic 
informatio, make it possible for governments to control populations with greater 
efficiency. All of which enhances the ability of dominant ethnic groups to control 
unwanted immigration and retain ethno-national congruence.  
Overall, though, the balance has probably swung against dominant ethnicity in 
the West because liberal norms mitigate against the use of border control technology 
to ensure ethnic dominance. Thus the kind of immigration controls applied by Gulf 
Arab or even East Asian regimes are currently viewed as politically unacceptable in 
western countries. The same is true when it comes to the narration of history, with 
dominant ethnic narratives subordinated to official 'civic' national histories which 
emphasise immigrant contributions and diversity and irrupt the tie binding members 
of the dominant group to their heroic and mythic ancestors. Even the state's censuses 
and ethnic monitoring forms often only refer to minority categories as distinct ethnic 
groups, with the majority occupying the residual category of 'white'. Whether this 
reflects the unreflective power of the dominant group to hide itself as nonethnic (see 
Doane 1997), or demonstrates the political weakness of dominant ethnic lobbyists, the 
end result is a non-recognition of the dominant ethnie, whose members may only 
know who they are not (minorities), rather than carrying a positive sense of who they 
are.  
Paradoxically, the increasingly fluid and porous society which enables the 
assimilation of outsiders simultaneously hinders the development of dominant ethnic 
associations, collective memories and political networks. While the state supports 
certain aspects of dominant ethnicity through the promotion of an official language, 
political history and public architecture, there is a vacuum at the level of vernacular 
culture, collective memory and political interests. With no associational life to fill this 
void, an absence of social capital results, which places dominant groups at a 
disadvantage. Combined with the second demographic transition, cultural 
liberalism/multiculturalism and the effects of globalisation, this stacks the deck in 
favour of long-term dominant ethnic decline. In short, civic nationalism provides little 
protection for the ethnic boundaries of groups like the Anglo-Canadians, Quebecois 
de souche, or ethnic Dutch of Holland. 
 
Dominant Nationhood 
 
I have been asked by the organisers to also address the theme of 'dominant 
nationhood', and the idea of a majority approach to nationalism. Of course, the two 
ideas need not be coterminous. Dominant nationhood certainly could be applied by a 
minority nation towards its own ethnic minorities as part of a project of assimilation. 
Catalans and Quebecois can thereby act as dominant nationalists in Catalonia and 
Quebec. However, for the most part, dominant nationalism will tend to reflect the 
perspective of the nation which forms a majority in the state. In other words, 
dominant nationalism is often the same as majoritarian state nationalism. Thus the 
French nation is dominant in France, the English nation in Britain, the English-
speaking 'Canadian' nation in Canada, the Japanese in Japan, and so on.  
What of the relationship to dominant ethnicity? Here we would do well to 
remember that nations are not the same creatures as ethnic groups since nations are 
mainly communities of territory, political aspiration and mass culture and so may 
include a fringe of ethnic outsiders who are civically assimilated. The relationship 
between dominant ethnicity and dominant nationhood is not therefore automatic, for it 
is possible that dominant ethnic elites may invest their political energy in an inclusive 
state nationalism. This kind of 'civic' project may well involve significant 
contributions from minority ethnic groups, and may be a synthesis of these different 
ethnic contributions. At the mass level, ethnic outsiders may reciprocate with loyalty 
and fervour to the nation - as with Jewish loyalty to the German nation between 1870 
and 1914.  
That said, the mytho-symbolic connection between the myths and memories of 
the dominant ethnie and 'its' nation are typically robust. (Smith 1986) This means that 
most state nationalisms are controlled by members of the dominant ethnic group, with 
minorities often ambivalent, or playing only token roles. This is clear in the realm of 
historiography. In the American case, history texts at the school and university levels 
were not only written almost entirely by Anglo-Protestants prior to the 1960s, but 
specifically by those of New England ancestry. Likewise, 'patriotic' societies like the 
Daughters of the American Revolution or American Legion often blurred the line 
between state nationalist commemorations and dominant ethnic concerns like 
'qualitative' immigration restriction. (Kaufmann 2004) Though there are some 
exceptions (such as the disproportionate role of Christians in Arab nationalist 
movements), most civic nationalists tend to hail from the dominant group. 
 
Eyeballing Nationalism: A Majority Perspective on the Nation 
 
 Before going any further in understanding majority perspectives on the nation, 
it behooves us to set out a paradigm for understanding perspectivism and identity, 
broadly construed. To wit, it is readily apparent that there is no single perspective on 
the nation. Indeed, this is a theoretical problem in the field of nationalism and political 
identity more generally. Let me briefly list some of the main issues raised by 
perspectivism. This is the idea that one's view of the nation varies, depending on one's 
location in terms of: 
1. Ethnicity - Is the individual from the dominant ethnic group, or from a minority 
group? 
2. Geography - Does the individual come from a specific region or locale? Do they 
reside in the nation or are they part of the diaspora? 
3. Ideology - What is the set of universalist/ethical ideas that is influencing the 
individual in question? 
4. Class/Status - Where in the system of economic, status and power relations does 
the individual reside? 
5. Instrumental interests - Might one profit politically or economically by the 
national project, or might such a project adversely affect one's interests? 
6. International and geopolitical context - Which other countries are the main 
reference points, friends and foes of the nation? Where are they similar and where 
different? 
7. Other identities - Gender and lifestyle may affect one's perspective. 
8. Psychology - Given the totality of an individual's social identities and ethical 
commitments, how compatible are these with national identity?  
 
One may label these perspectives the lenses which one uses to view one's nation. The 
key question is how to square these diverse perspectives with the idea of 'a national 
identity', be this dominant or otherwise. Postmodernists contend that diversity 
fragments the nation to the point that it becomes meaningless to speak of an entity 
such as 'French national identity' and that any attempt to do so amounts to reification 
of the nation. (Hall 1996) On the other hand, ethnosymbolist theorists maintain that 
collective representations of the nation largely coalesce around established, path-
dependent myths and symbols, which largely constitute the national identity, 
irrespective of how certain individuals incorporate such an identity into their psychic 
repertoires. (Smith 1991) Collective representations of the nation may also gain the 
backing of powerful institutions like the education system and the state, thereby 
achieving 'official' status and shaping the worldview of entire generations. (Weber 
1976) Others propose that it is the overlap between different perspectives on the 
nation that constitutes the nation's identity. (Wimmer 2002) Wimmer adds that one 
needs to distinguish between the highly situational and fluid ways in which 
individual's construct their national identities and the more stable content of collective 
representations of the nation. (Wimmer 2007)  
John Hutchinson and Oliver Zimmer make a different argument, drawing 
attention to the ways in which different class or ideological actors select differently 
from a common fund of symbolic resources. For Zimmer, there is no evidence for a 
distinct 'ethnic' or 'civic' nationalism, but only a set of symbolic resources and the 
volition of those who interpret them. Symbolic resources include landscape, political 
institutions and memories, language, genealogy, other aspects of culture, 
physiognomy, and so forth. Interpreters may choose to view these organically (i.e. 
'ethnically') or in voluntarist (i.e. 'civic') terms. (Zimmer 2003) Language, for 
instance, was viewed organically by nineteenth century Polish nationalists, but is 
currently viewed as an instrument of civic inclusion by American, Quebec or Catalan 
nationalists. Genealogy may furnish the basis for a völkish nationalism, as in 
nineteenth century Germany, or, in 'diverse' plural form, can serve as a resource for 
civic nationalism, as in Canada or Britain today. Alternatively, certain symbols may 
simply be downplayed, such as the pre-Islamic past of contemporary Iran (though the 
anti-Islamist diaspora would seek to focus on these symbols). 
By constantly referring to their opposing visions for the nation, diverse actors 
paradoxically reinforce the reality of the nation. Thus the nineteenth century French 
republicans who invoked the 'free' tribal Gauls as their ancestors and their Catholic-
conservative adversaries who instead extolled the aristocratic Franks as the true ur-
French both helped reinforce the idea of a French nation with premodern ethnic 
origins. Genealogy was the resource, but its interpretation differed depending on the 
lens used. (Zimmer 2003; Hutchinson 2005) Moreover, though differing in their 
views of the nation's symbolic content, competing actors operated within the same 
broad framework: that of a French nation with relatively fixed geographical and 
institutional forms. They thus focused upon a similar politico-geographic referent. 
 This discussion seems to have settled upon three basic elements within 
national identity, which I will term referents, lenses and resources. Referents refer to 
the politico-geographic framework. Thus an individual in Pamplona may be primarily 
interested in a local Pamplonan, provincial Navarrean, Basque national, Spanish 
national, European supranational or global political project. In viewing this referent, 
the said individual may apply different lenses corresponding to their geographic, 
social, ideological, instrumental, international, ethnic and psychic location. Finally, 
the individual would be operating with a fund of symbolic resources laid down by 
history. The stock of linguistic, archaeological, institutional, geographical, 
genealogical and historical resources is not infinite, and it is often difficult to 
plausibly invent these ex nihilo.  
We might perceive the link between referent, lens and resource as similar to 
the way we perceive objects. Philosophers have long quarrelled over whether our 
perception of reality is mainly the result of sense-perceptions (i.e. Locke and 
empricism) or innate Ideas hardwired into our mind (i.e. Plato, Kant and rationalism). 
Our eyes mediate between our inner world of reason, and the outer world of ultimate 
reality. Using this analogy, we can think of referents as real objects, lenses as our 
eyes, and resources as our internal ideas. In so doing, we can depict the process of 
national imagination as an interaction between referent, lens and resource, as in figure 
1. Thus light from the referent (say a region) is refracted through various locational 
lenses to focus upon different interpretations of the existing stock of symbolic 
resources. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 The National Gaze: An Optical Metaphor for National Identity 
 
 
Dominant Nationalism Revisited 
  
With this optical analogy in mind, let us return to the problem of majority 
nationalism. Majority nationalism takes the political institutions and territory of the 
entire state as its referent. It views the nation through the lens of the majority of the 
population - be this an ethnic majority or a coalition of ethnic groups sharing the same 
language, race or religion. And this gaze in turn leads it to interpret its stock of 
symbolic resources in certain ways. Let us now consider some concrete examples of 
how this works in practice. 
Consider Revolutionary France, the paradigm case of state nationalism. The 
referent was the French territory and its state institutions. The interpretive lenses 
mainly included the liberal-democratic ideology of the Enlightenment, a Paris/Île de 
France regional inflection, an ethnic French (as opposed to Breton or Provençal) 
perspective, and the self-interests of disaffected nobles and the bourgeoisie. Though 
revolutionary French nationalism focused heavily on newly-created cultural resources 
like the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the fêtes, the flag, the army and 
monumental architecture, the old symbols were soon reinterpreted by republicans. 
The French language (as embodying liberty and rationality), its genealogy (linked to 
the Gauls), its land (the idea of the hexagon) and its premodern history (Joan of Arc 
as a republican hero) were all highlighted in particular ways by the lenses of 
revolutionary nationalists. (Baycroft 2006)  
In the United States, we can discern many of the same lenses: a liberal-
Enlightenment Whig ideology, a New England-influenced regional gaze, and the self-
interests of expansionist backcountry small farmers and middle strata. These refracted 
the vision of the United States in peculiar ways. The genealogy of the Americans 
focused upon the Anglo-Saxons, the supposedly freedom-loving ancient inhabitants of 
England who had been conquered by the aristocratic Normans whose dynasty ruled in 
Britain. (Horsman 1981) This was in keeping with an older English Whig tradition 
which counterpoised the liberal Anglo-Saxons to the Tory Normans. (Hutchinson 
2005)  
The English language was of lesser interest as a resource since it failed to 
distinguish the Americans from the English, but Americans' low-church, dissenting 
Protestant traditions were sometimes used to distinguish the new nation from 
England, with its established church. The small independent farmer, or Yeoman, a 
lifestyle symbol, was selected as the exemplar of the American republic, as opposed 
to the nobles and tenants of the Old Country. (Smith 1950) Politically, American 
liberals looked to their Greco-Roman republican traditions rather than their roman 
imperial or Norman imperial resources. It is also worth mentioning that certain 
resources were simply unavailable to the Americans: the French language was not 
part of the American symbolic arsenal, no matter what advantages this might have 
conferred upon the revolutionaries in terms of calling upon the resources of their 
French allies. 
A glance at the workings of minority nationalism can help throw dominant 
nationalism into sharper relief. Basque nationalism is focused on the Basque country 
as a referent. Prior to the late nineteenth century, many Basque writers lacked a 
vocabulary of Basque nationalism but viewed their Basque country through the lenses 
of Catholic conservatism, Spanish Imperial royalism, and juxtaposed it to the 
dominant Castilian core of Spain. Basque royalism does not mean that Basque 
identity was lacking, since many held the Basque country to be their principal 
referent. Yet in expounding their Basque national identity, they often spoke of the 
Basque country as the brightest light of the empire, or as exemplifying the Catholic 
virtues and enterprise of the Spanish empire. Urban Basque perspectives remained 
dominant in this worldview rather than rural ones. We can also more easily see how 
Basque national identity could antedate Basque nationalism. (Jacobson 2006)  
The Basque case provides a neat bridge across to Canadian nationalism 
because both Basque and Canadian national identities were formerly viewed through 
an imperial lens. Canada has long presented a conundrum for nationalism. Canadian 
nationalism has been described as variously colonial, binational (McRoberts 1997), 
civic (Breton 1988) or even post-nationalist (Cook 2007; Sigurdson 2000). However, 
if we prise apart referent, lens and resources, Canadian nationalism comes into 
sharper focus. To begin with, Canadian nationalism has always focused on the entire 
Canadian landmass and state. On the other hand, French-Canadian and Quebec 
nationalism have always maintained a strong interest in the lower St. Lawrence River 
Valley as a territorial referent. Though Quebec nationalism - focused on Quebec's 
provincial institutions - is more recent, the constitutional concerns of French-
Canadian leaders to maintain a French-dominated province go back to the 1841 
partition of Lower Canada. In terms of ethnic and linguistic lenses, Canadian 
nationalism has largely been the brainchild of English-speaking Canadians, almost 
exclusively of British descent. They have largely imagined the Canadian nation, with 
occasional input from French and other Canadians. Regionally, central Canada 
(southern Ontario and Anglo-Quebec) has been the cradle of Canadianism.   
Prior to 1867, and, for many anglophones, prior to 1945, Canadian national 
identity was primarily expressed through the idiom of British loyalism. This ideology 
championed the superiority of British institutions like the monarchy and liberal 
democracy, and stressed the unity of the empire - especially the British dominions. 
(Cole 1970; Buckner 2004) Despite this lens, anglophone Canadians were 
preoccupied with Canada. They thus saw themselves in relation to the British empire 
much as Basques did to Spain, as the cream of empire, whose virtues exemplified 
those of the imperial project and would shine the way for others. Thus Canadian 
Loyalists were 'a superior breed of loyal Briton' who could rejuvenate a decadent 
metropole. (Rasporich 1968: 150) Like the nineteenth century Basques, Canadians 
also wore an international lens, and thus sought to define themselves in relation to the 
metropolitan core, in this case in England rather than Castile. At no point was 
Canadian loyalism oriented to the 'green and pleasant land' of England or other Old 
Country reference points. 
A similar process can be observed today among Ulster-Protestant loyalists. 
Their referent, sometimes called their 'country', is Ulster (the six counties of Northern 
Ireland), not England or Scotland.3 However, the main lens which they employ to 
interpret their homeland is British loyalism or Unionism rather than Ulster 
nationalism.4 The interplay between these two generates many curious phenomena, 
not least the fact that most Ulster-Protestants describe their identity as 'British' and 
employ British symbols like the Union Jack, but would rather run their own affairs 
within Britain than live under British direct rule. (Kaufmann 2007, ch. 4) Canadians 
were similar, using British symbols and describing themselves as 'British', yet seeking 
the strongest possible measure of political autonomy possible while remaining within 
Britain. 
As we move to the more recent period, Canadians (i.e. English-speakers 
narrating the nation) began to assert a distinct national identity based largely on the 
symbolism of the northern landscape. This emerged early in the twentieth century, 
embodied in, among others, the Native Sons of Canada movement, Group of Seven 
painters and the new designs for a Canadian flag. This largely reflected a shift from a 
British loyalist lens to a Canadian liberal-nationalist one, and resulted in a 
downplaying of British genealogical resources and the foregrounding of the Canadian 
landscape as a nationalist resource. (Kaufmann 1998) In the 1960s, the cultural 
earthquake of the international New Left captured the imagination of many English 
Canadian intellectuals, as well as many of mixed heritage, like Pierre Trudeau. This 
ideological lens largely replaced the old liberal-nationalist one, resulting in a new 
interpretation of Canada's symbolic resources. 
One of the lineaments of this new identity was an emphasis on a plural, or 
'multicultural' genealogy, despite the fact that only a small minority of European 
Canadians in the 1960s had no British or French ancestry. British ancestry was 
downplayed even more strenuously than in the earlier liberal nationalism because of 
its associations with the ethnic domination of subaltern groups. Moreover, the 
northern landscape also came under attack for its 'macho' connotations and 
insufficient urbanity. (Russell 1966) As in the United States, a New Left ideological 
lens fused with a strongly urban perspective to colour dominant concepts of 
nationhood. In Canada, this new cultural radicalism shone light on some slender 
symbolic resources (such as Canada's limited non-British/non-French ancestry and its 
limited urban intellectual culture). Over time, non-traditional immigration and 
growing urbanisation has strengthened these symbolic resources and reinforced the 
emphasis on multiculturalism which characterises Canadian nationalism. A dash of 
American neoliberalism shares lens space with cultural radicalism, and emphasises 
mobility, technology, globalisation and futuristic architecture. Together, these 
cosmopolitan ideologies produce a narrative of futuristic multiculturalism in which 
traditional left-wing class politics is strikingly absent. 
All the while, the main voices of Canadian nationalism continued to be 
English, though the pantheon of narrators expanded somewhat from the original 
WASP core. This begs our earlier question: can contemporary Canadian nationalism 
be described as 'postnational', 'postmodern' or 'global'? (Cook 2007; Sigurdson 2000) 
This is certainly the claim of many anglophone Canadian intellectuals, but it does not 
bear scrutiny. Instead, what we can say is that the elite narrators of Canadian identity 
are viewing their nation through an ideological lens of futuristic multiculturalism. 
Though the ideology contains the potential to become the basis for a global superstate, 
Canadian intellectuals and federal Liberals desire no such thing. On the contrary, like 
their loyalist spiritual ancestors, their national identity is inward-looking, focused on 
Canada rather than the world. Canada is thus placed at the centre of the universal 
ideology. It is held to exemplify the highest virtues of liberal cosmopolitanism: 
dynamic, wealthy and high-tech as well as diverse, tolerant and hybridised. Substitute 
the lens of British liberal imperialism for that of liberal cosmopolitanism and one is 
instantly transported back to the Canada of a hundred years ago. 
Canada's liberal cosmopolitanism is potentially global, as was the socialism of 
the USSR and China. But, like Stalin's 'socialism in one country' or Iran's Islamism, 
this cosmopolitan ideology is used as a prop of national pride in which the nation 
claims a special role as the chosen missionary for a given universal idea. This was the 
mantle donned by the Russians in the Tsarist empire, the English in the British empire 
and the Austro-Germans in the Habsburg empire. (Kumar 2003; Roshwald 2006) 
Missionary nationalisms in the past have often tipped over into imperialism, and it is 
here that the dark side of 'civic' nationalism becomes apparent. Missionary 
nationalists like the English or the Russians chose not to focus on ethnic exclusivity 
and particularism and are thus lauded for their open-mindedness. Yet, for this precise 
reason, they are often expansionist and intolerant of others' 'narrow' ethnic nationalist 
aspirations. Armenians who stood in the way of Ottomanism; Tatars, Chechens and 
Volga Germans who failed to wave the Soviet flag; Irish who spurned the British 
empire and the Basques who failed to be adequately enthusiastic about Spanishness 
were victims of an expansionist 'civic' nationalism. We see this attitude today in many 
countries like Ghana, where autonomy claims are derided as parochial and out-of-
keeping with the spirit of 'civic' national unity. (Brown 2000; Roshwald 2006)  
On the contrary, ethnic nationalism, whatever its flaws, can serve as a restraint 
on expansion. Many of those, like William Jennings Bryan, who argued against 
American colonial expansion into the ex-Spanish colonies like the Philippines did so 
on the ground that the colonised could not become Americans. 'Are we to bring into 
the body politic eight or ten million Asiatics,' asked Bryan in 1899, 'so different from 
us in race and history that amalgamation is impossible?' (Love 1997; Moorhead 1994: 
158) In Russia, a minor chord of Russian ethnic nationalism, though exclusivist, also 
counselled against an expansionist mission civilisatrice into neighbouring areas 
(especially if non-Slavic) for fear of diluting Russia's soul and dissipating its energies. 
(Kaufman 1996) 'Little Englandism' and Kemalist Turkish nationalism bear similar 
relationships to the expansionist British and Ottoman projects.  
Canadian nationalism, like its American counterpart, is a missionary 
nationalism whose elite espouses a cosmopolitan liberal ideology. The Canadian 
variant may stress cultural radicalism more and espouse a (slightly) restrained 
enthusiasm for globalisation, but the two remain similar. Hence the lament of an 
American cultural nationalist like Samuel Huntington, who bemoans the global 
cosmopolitanism of the American intellectual elite. The flipside of Huntington's 
cultural nationalism is a realist desire to limit American liberal imperialism overseas, 
which Huntington views as an ill-fated missionary project doomed to falter on the 
rocks of others' nationalism. (Huntington 2004) 
Missionary nationalisms tend to be intolerant of particularism because they see 
themselves as universal ethical projects. Canada's missionary nationalism, based on 
the lens of futurist multiculturalism, has been forced to confront the particularism of 
Quebec nationalism. Though Quebec nationalism has exchanged its Catholic 
nationalist lenses for those of a left-wing secular nationalism, it has never embraced 
the kind of liberal cosmopolitanism espoused by anglophone Canadian nationalists. 
Canadian nationalists denounce Quebec for standing in the way of the 
multiculturalist-futurist vision, for being insufficiently tolerant, open and forward-
looking. For example, the events surrounding the banning of an Ottawa soccer team 
(one of whose players wore a hijab) from participating in a Quebec tournament in 
2007 grabbed national headlines. (CBC 2007) The event was deployed by Canadian 
nationalists as proof of the intolerant and backward nature of Quebec nationalism, and 
of Quebec's failure to celebrate the liberal cosmopolitan ideology of Canadian 
multiculturalism.  
In the background lurks the claim that Canadian identity is based on universal 
values while that of Quebec is nationalist. In truth, however, only the ideological lens 
used by Canadian nationalists is cosmopolitan. The politico-territorial referents 
remain Canada vs. Quebec, thus this is not a contest of cosmopolitanism vs. 
nationalism, but rather a set of competing nationalisms. Canadian missionary 
nationalism dominates in Canada (including Quebec) while Quebec's cultural 
nationalism dominates in Quebec (apart from federal powers). The Iranian case can be 
productively compared to that of Canada. In Iran, the universal Islamist ideals of the 
Revolution are inclusive - stretching well beyond the 40-50 percent Persian ethnic 
core to encompass almost all Iranian citizens. However, for minorities like the Kurds, 
who harbour particularist desires, this universalism may actually be more coercive 
than the Persian ethnic nationalism of the Shah. 
 
Dominant Ethnicity and Dominant Nationhood: Normative Considerations 
 
The foregoing inevitably raises the issue of whether dominant ethnicity and 
dominant nationhood can be morally justified. Normative political theorising on 
problems of ethnicity and nationalism has developed considerably since the 
pioneering work of Michael Walzer and Will Kymlicka in the late 1980s. Those 
operating within the mainstream liberal culturalist (or liberal multiculturalist) school 
of thought have sought to endorse a ‘politics of recognition’ in which collective 
identities are politically recognised through some form of multicultural policy. Taylor 
and Kymlicka both see value in ethnic and national identities, which they claim 
enhance the self worth and ‘context of choice’ of individuals, thereby furthering the 
aims of liberalism. (Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1992) In order to reconcile their liberal 
and communal commitments, many liberal culturalists define ethnic groups and 
nations as ‘cultures’ which are associational in nature and involved in a process of 
constant change.  
 Elsewhere, I have criticised the liberal culturalist position as utterly unrealistic 
in its view of the way ethnic and national identities function, confusing culture and 
identity: 
 
We have no grounds for speaking of cultures as 'synonymous with a nation or 
a people.' (Kymlicka 1995: 18) Instead, what we may say is that cultural 
symbols may function as markers for ethnic and national boundaries while 
cultural myths might furnish the material for group narratives. In all cases, 
however, the ethnic or national community is the active agent, not the culture. 
Therefore it is all the more pressing that we synthesise liberalism with active 
communities, and not merely passive cultures. Cultures may offer us contexts 
of choice, and this may further the aims of liberalism. However, what really 
ought to concern us is the manner in which liberalism can accommodate 
communities' use of cultural contexts for the purposes of boundary 
demarcation and mytho-symbolic group narration. (Kaufmann 2000: 1092) 
 
Liberal nationalist writers like Yael Tamir and David Miller are more realistic, but it 
is unclear how their civic brand of nationalism can be squared with the recognition of 
ethnic minority rights without diluting the content (and hence popular appeal) of a 
national identity. (Miller 1995: 25; Tamir 1993: 65-6, 83) Kymlicka and Taylor have 
attempted to reconcile liberal multiculturalism (i.e. Canadian dominant nationalism) 
and liberal nationalism (i.e. Quebec dominant nationalism) by differentiating between 
minority nations and immigrant ethnocultural communities. This sleight-of-hand 
maintains the multicultural edifice while creating an exception for minority nations 
who want no truck with multiculturalism. Of course, this exercise basically involves 
twisting principles to suit political realities. Why Quebec’s language laws are 
justifiable while America's Official English movement is not remains unanswered. 
Presumably, weight is being given to cultural threats and past injustices, but, if so, this 
has not been systematically integrated into the argument (such a provision would open 
up a Pandora’s Box of tricky issues). 
 Rather than liberal multiculturalism or liberal nationalism (which have many 
mutually antithetical properties), I favour a model of liberal ethnicity which is 
compatible with both nations and ethnic groups, whether these be majorities or 
minorities, dominant or subaltern. Dominance is a bad word for political scientists, 
but, in truth, no nation or ethnic group could maintain its corporate existence without 
dominance over a particular territory and/or some set of institutions. Even oppressed 
groups like the Tibetans dominate some spheres of life in Tibet, and could take a more 
tolerant attitude to their members who stray from Tibetan culture. We might wish to 
encourage the Tibetans and all others to adopt a relativistic attitude toward their 
communal narrative and boundaries out of an allergy to dominance. But this pose will 
produce a multiculturalist reductio an absurdum in which all institutions and 
territories are forced to be multicultural. Within each component of the mosaic we 
compel the same multicultural fragmentation-within-fragmentation, and so on, until 
we reach the level of the individual. Thus the end result of proscribing any kind of 
ethnic or national dominance over territory or institutions is to force people to divest 
themselves of trans-generational identities in favour of more ephemeral, 
individualistic identities like lifestyle or ideology.  
If we accept a measure of dominance, as I feel we must, the key question is 
how to exercise it. Dominance needs to be sufficient for the nation or ethnic group to 
maintain its collective memory and boundary symbols over generations. The key is 
for dominance to be exercised within strict liberal limits. Also, ethnic groups should 
be as inclusive as is possible while still maintaining their ethnic boundaries. Groups 
should adopt a confident posture, tolerant until there is incontrovertible proof that 
core ethnic or national symbols (ie language, religion, phenotype) are being 
irredeemably eroded. Ethnic groups sometimes maintain rigid barriers to entry (as in 
say Northern Ireland between Protestants and Catholics, or North India between 
Hindus and Muslims). In other situations, as in much of sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Americas, ethnic boundaries are more fluid, with a good deal of assimilation taking 
place even as ethnic boundaries remain in place. (Wimmer 2007) I claim that the 
latter variety of 'liberal ethnicity' allows for a better balancing of people's needs for 
ethno-communal continuity and individual autonomy. (Kaufmann 2000)  
 
Coda: Federalism and Democracy 
 
The foregoing discussion throws up a number of issues for democratic federalism, a 
major concern of this book. Much has been encapsulated by Brendan O' Leary's 
brilliant article on the subject. He remarks that stable and democratic federations 
'must have a Staatsvolk, a national or ethnic people who are demographically and 
electorally dominant'. (O' Leary 2001: 284-5) 50 percent may be considered a 
minimum threshold. From the USSR to Yugoslavia, Pakistan (East and West) to the 
Caribbean (St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla), East Africa (Kenya-Uganda-Tanganyika) to 
Malaysia (Malay-Singapore), breakup or a lack of democracy has been the norm for 
federal experiments. The few successful, democratic, truly multi-national federations - 
Canada, Belgium, Switzerland and India - stand out as the only exceptions to the rule 
of federal decomposition. Yet even here, all can plausibly claim a dominant ethnie or 
dominant nation to anchor them. It seems that a confident dominant majority is 
necessary to make the sacrifices (perhaps financial, or political - granting 
asymmetrical power to minority-dominated federal units) which sustain mutual trust 
in shared federal mechanisms, constitutions and formulae. (O' Leary 2001: 285-92)  
The quid pro quo is that the regionally-dominant nations/ethnies in the 
minority federal units cannot press their claims for self-determination to their logical 
conclusion, for the ultimate consequence of this behaviour is secession, which may 
spur the breakup of the federation. Scots, Catalans and Quebecois, for instance, would 
need to temper their desire for statehood to settle for autonomy. Much also arguably 
depends upon the presence of 'glue' in the federation, which is in turn a function of the 
degree of ideological allegiance (to, for example Soviet socialism, European Unity or 
Canadian left-wing nationalism), shared political projects or perceived economic 
benefits. What if there is no majority? O' Leary usefully suggests that consociational 
mechanisms (such as proportional employment of ethnic groups in the civil service, 
increased minority autonomy or minority vetoes in sensitive areas) can reduce the 
anxieties of federal minorities. This may transform the federation into a confederal or 
even international arrangement, but, as is true of the European Union, this may be the 
best we can hope for in the absence of a dominant majority. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined the phenomena of dominant ethnicity and dominant 
nationhood. I have argued that a series of contemporary pressures - globalisation, 
democratisation, the second demographic transition, liberalisation - have helped to 
foreground dominant ethnic groups, drawing them out from behind their national 
screens. The question of how to address the claims of dominant ethnic groups will 
become an increasingly pressing issue in the twenty-first century. I have argued that it 
is unrealistic and normatively unjustified to argue for the extinction of dominant 
ethnicity upon the altar of civic nationalism. All ethnic groups need to be dominant 
over some territory and/or institutions to perpetuate themselves. We are all dominant 
ethnics somewhere. The question is how to manage and constrain dominance so as to 
respect liberal norms and minority rights.  
Dominant nationhood is in some ways a less clear construct than dominant 
ethnicity because the nation tends to be more elastic in its definition than an ethnie. 
Generally speaking, dominant nations are state nations, but it is possible to conceive 
of a sub-state nation exercising dominance over certain policy areas in its territory, as 
is true in say Quebec or Catalonia. The Canadian case presents us with something of a 
conundrum, and many Anglo-Canadian intellectuals claim that their vision is actually 
postnational. This premise is rejected, and is deconstructed through the use of an 
optical metaphor of national identity, consisting of a politico-territorial referent 'out 
there', an ideological lens and a series of symbolic resources which may be used or 
downplayed. This perspective reveals that dominant nationhood lurks behind the 
universalist ideologies under whose banner 'missionary' nations like the USSR, the 
United States or Iran often march. Canada's ostensibly 'postnational' ideology of 
multicultural futurism is in fact merely another lens through which English Canadians 
peer at the same Canadian coast-to-coast referent. There is no global gaze here. 
Canadian elites may labour on behalf of a universal mission of multiculturalism, but 
their focus is on Canada. Canada is thus located at the centre of the ideology, much as 
Khomeini viewed Iran as an exemplar for Islam, or Stalin viewed the USSR as the 
cockpit of socialism. In the end, the much vaunted postnationalism remains a species 
of dominant nationhood whose supposed moral universality makes it all the more 
effective in the battle to delegitimise competing nationalisms like that of Quebec. 
Finally, the presence of dominant ethnicity and nationhood should not overly concern 
us - most groups need to be dominant somewhere if they are to survive. Indeed, the 
future of federalist democracy probably hinges on the existence of secure dominant 
majorities willing to underwrite them. 
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1 Leading works in this area include Smith (1986; 1991), Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983); Hobsbawm 
[1990] 1993, and Connor (1994). 
2 The classic exposition of the 'ethnie-to-nation' argument appears in Smith, (1986). See also 
Hutchinson (1987). A critique of ethno-symbolism can be found in Ozkirimli (2003). 
3 There are actually nine historic counties of Ulster, though three remained with the Republic of Ireland 
after partition in 1922. These 'border' counties of Monaghan, Donegal and Cavan all have significant 
Protestant minorities and Orange traditions. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
4 There is a narrative of Ulster nationalism and independence, but this has never garnered more than 
fringe support. (Patterson and Kaufmann 2007) 
